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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The newly established euro area money market has attracted some at-
tention in the literature in recent years (Hartmann, Manna and Man-
zanares, 2001; Bindseil and Seitz, 2001; Bartolini, Bertola and Prati,
2002; W￿rtz, 2003). While some of the features of the euro area money
market are close to those of the US market, for example the presence
of an averaging mechanism and the need for banks to ful￿l a reserve
requirement over a maintenance period, there are also aspects of the
euro market which depart from the US experience studied extensively
in the literature (Perez Quiros and Mendizabal, 2001). For example,
￿uctuations in the overnight rate in the euro area have been limited
within the corridor between the rate on the marginal lending facility
and that on the deposit facility. Moreover, while the federal funds rate
is an explicit target for the US Federal Reserve and has an important
signalling role, supported by daily open market operations, in the euro
area the overnight rate is not a policy rate and signalling is achieved
mainly through the main re￿nancing rate and the associated corridor
between the rates on the standing facilities.1 These original features
may make it worthwhile to study the euro area money market in more
detail.
Recent papers on the euro area money market have tended to focus
on the demand side of the market. This paper takes a closer look at the
supply side of the market, in the same spirit of the studies by Feinman
(1993) and Taylor (2001) for the US. In particular, we look at the reg-
ular provision of liquidity in the euro area on a weekly basis. We also
present a weekly demand model which may be thought of as the relevant
constraint for the central bank￿s weekly supply of liquidity and may be
important for an evaluation of the policy from a welfare perspective, al-
though we do not develop this analysis in full in the paper. By presenting
a simple model of supply and demand of liquidity in the euro area, this
paper is closest in spirit especially to Taylor￿s (2001) paper. The supply
equation, a ￿liquidity reaction function￿ for the ECB, links the provision
of liquidity to the level of the EONIA spread or other very short-term
interest rate indicators and to special situations which occurred during
the considered sample period. It should be noted that our analysis is
descriptive in nature and does not claim to identify the ECB￿s liquidity
reaction function which would have prevailed under conditions diﬀerent
from those which occurred during our sample period, nor the liquidity
1In our sample period from mid 1999 until November 2002 the main re￿nancing
rate was always at the middle of the corridor between the marginal lending rate and
the deposit rate.
2policy which would necessarily prevail in the future. The demand model
in the paper relates the spread between the overnight rate in the euro
area and the main re￿nancing rate, henceforth ￿EONIA spread￿2,t ot h e
prevailing liquidity situation,d e ￿ned as the average daily reserves surplus
accumulated from the beginning of the maintenance period, excluding
recourse to the standing facilities (non-borrowed reserves).
The econometric analysis in the paper, based on weekly data from
mid-1999 to November 2002, reveals two interesting features. First, we
￿nd that the ECB has generally provided liquidity in a neutral and
smooth way during our sample period, apart from some special circum-
stances such as the underbidding episodes which occurred four times in
2001. Moreover, it appears that there was also some reaction, albeit
limited, to the deviation of the EONIA and other short-term spot and
forward interest rates from the main re￿nancing rate. In particular, if
the overnight rate, or other very short-term rates, were above the main
re￿nancing rate, primarily re￿ecting expectations of a change in the main
re￿nancing rate during the same maintenance period, the liquidity allot-
ment has sometimes been slightly loose, and vice versa. However, in light
of the results of the demand side of the model, the reaction to interest
rate change expectations prevailing in the maintenance period has been
very small. This appears to indicate that, in the sample period, a large
weight in the ECB liquidity management￿s loss function was attributed
to providing liquidity in a smooth and neutral manner, whereas short-
term ￿uctuations in the EONIA and other very short-term rates did not
lead to adjustments in liquidity policy. Prima facie,t h i sm i g h tb es e e n
as being consistent with a scheme between the ￿dealing rate model￿ and
￿open mouth approach￿ (Manna, Pill and Quiros, 2001), or a ￿hands-oﬀ
approach￿ (Bartolini and Prati, 2003), in which the overnight rate is not
a policy objective, unlike the case for the federal funds rate in the US.
At the same time, it should be noted that the environment of orderly
conditions in the money market which generally prevailed during the
￿rst four years of EMU may have also worked against an active liquidity
policy, and this factor should also be taken into account when interpret-
ing the results. In fact, if there are no strong expectations of a change
in the main re￿nancing rate within the maintenance period, there is no
trade-oﬀ between liquidity and interest rate smoothing.3
Second, as regards the demand side, we ￿nd that liquidity ￿imbal-
2The EONIA is a transaction-weighted daily average of the overnight rate in the
euro area.
3It should be noted that this distinguishes our analysis from the strand of litera-
ture on whether the central bank should target the monetary base or interest rates.
On this conceptual diﬀerence, see Gilchrist (2001).
3ances￿ have aﬀected the overnight rate only in the last week of the main-
tenance period, when the ECB cannot correct them unless by making
recourse to a ￿ne-tuning operation, which are used very seldom. Reserve
requirements are binding on the last day of the maintenance period in
the euro area (there are no carry-over provisions) and the demand curve
becomes vertical. Before the last main re￿nancing operation (MRO) of
the maintenance period, liquidity imbalances aﬀect the EONIA spread
only to a very small extent, indicating that there is practically no ￿liq-
uidity eﬀect￿ in the euro area apart from the very last days of the period
(see Hamilton, 1996, and Thornton, 2001a and 2001b, for opposite views
in the US case).4 We interpret this result as indicating that the liquidity
services provided by a marginal unit of reserves are close to zero with
the reserve requirement in place in the euro area; intermediaries hold
reserves practically only in order to satisfy the reserve requirement. The
results suggest that the reserve requirement and the averaging mecha-
nism works eﬀectively in the euro area to contain the volatility of the
very short-term rates in response to liquidity shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the underpin-
nings of the weekly demand and supply model which is then estimated
in Section 3. Section 4 provides some discussion on the results of the
analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The empirical model
The main purpose of the empirical model proposed in this paper is to
establish a simple representation of the main features of the demand for
and supply of reserves in the euro area. The focus of the analysis is
in particular on the supply of reserves by the ECB, while demand acts
as a constraint on central bank behaviour and is an important element
in assessing the ECB￿s supply policy from a welfare perspective. The
focus on simplicity prevents the model from providing the best ex post
possible account of the considered variables (reserves and the overnight
rate). So, the analysis of this paper aims at capturing the main features
of the euro area money market in a simple and parsimonious manner,
closest in spirit to the recent study by Taylor (2001) for the market for
federal funds in the United States.
As our objective is to model the regular provision of liquidity by the
ECB, the frequency of the model is weekly.5 At this frequency, the supply
4Moschitz (2002) and W￿rtz (2003) reach a similar conclusion working on euro
area daily data. Angelini (2002), also studying daily data, however, ￿nds evidence
of a relatively small but signi￿cant liquidity eﬀect early in the maintenance period.
5The ECB￿s main re￿nancing operations (MROs) are carried out at a weekly
frequency. Normally, the allotment is decided and announced on Tuesday morning
4of liquidity is mainly determined by the central bank, while autonomous
factors play a more important role on a day-to-day basis. The (excess)
demand for liquidity is determined by the actions of the banking system.
Of course, the overnight rate in the euro area is determined by the
interaction of demand and supply factors.
2.1 The excess demand for liquidity and the overnight
rate
This section contains a simple model of excess demand for liquidity and
the interbank overnight rate in the euro area, the foundations of which
are mainly built on the related literature for the interbank market for
the federal funds in the United States.6 In fact, although the operational
framework in the euro area is diﬀerent from that of the Federal Reserve
and more similar to the ￿corridor￿ system in place for example in New
Zealand and Canada, the key elements of commercial banks￿ demand for
reserves identi￿ed in the US literature appear to be relevant also in the
euro area.
A standard approach to modelling banks￿ demand for reserves is to
consider a representative bank which has to satisfy a reserve requirement
constraint de￿ned over a multi-period maintenance period, and aiming at
minimizing its total borrowing costs during the period. In this context,
a conclusion is that, in the absence of frictions, the martingale property
should hold, namely:
rd − Edrd+1 =0 , (1)
where rd is the overnight rate on day d,a n dEd is the expectation
conditional on the information available on day d. If there are no frictions
in the market, any deviation from (1) would imply the possibility of an
inter-temporal arbitrage. This, however, is ruled out by the assumption
of rational expectations by market participants.
In realistic settings, however, in addition to changes in future ex-
pected overnight rates the current overnight rate might also be aﬀected
by current liquidity conditions prevailing, indicating the presence of a
liquidity eﬀect (Hamilton, 1996). A simple way to express this is to aug-
ment equation (1) by a term capturing the ￿liquidity situation￿ on day
each week, but there can be occasional deviations from this due to national holidays.
For a detailed account of the operational framework and liquidity management in
the euro area, see ECB (2002b); for a thorough analysis of the functioning of the
interbank money market in the euro area from a microstructure perspective, see
Hartmann, Manna and Manzanares (2001).
6It should be stressed from the onset that the focus of the present analysis is on
the weekly level of the overnight rate, and not on its volatility.
5d, Ld:
rd − Edrd+1 = −ϕLd (2)
If ϕ > 0, a shortage/overhang of reserves on day d leads to an in-
crease/decrease in the overnight rate on the same day, for a given ex-
pected level of the overnight rate prevailing in the remainder of the
maintenance period (Taylor, 2001). For the market for federal funds in
the United States, there is some evidence that a liquidity eﬀect exists
(i.e., ϕ > 0)a tadaily frequency (Hamilton, 1997).7 This might be
due to a number of factors, including limits to credit lines, transaction
costs, weekend accounting conventions (Hamilton, 1996), and reluctance
to borrow from the discount window (Clouse and Dow, 1999). Some of
these factors might also be relevant in the euro area (Bindseil and Seitz,
2001).
In this paper, we are interested in the excess demand function pre-
vailing at the frequency which is relevant for the ECB￿s MROs, namely
weekly. More precisely, we consider a frequency t de￿ned as the average
of the variables between day d and day d + j,w h e r ed is the day of the
MRO allotment (usually Tuesday every week) and d+j is either the day
of the following MRO or the end of the maintenance period, whatever











We are interested in modelling the excess demand function as an
average between day d and time d + j because this is the constraint
which is relevant from the perspective of liquidity management in the
euro area.



















7However, Thornton (2001a) has recently claimed that Hamilton￿s results are not
robust across diﬀerent sample periods and are heavily in￿uenced by outliers. See also
Thornton (2001b).
6Accordingly, equation (2) may be rewritten at a weekly frequency as:
rt − Etrt+1 = −ϕLt (7)
Further, let us de￿ne st = rt − mt, where mt is the main re￿nancing
rate prevailing in week t,a n dEtst,t+1 = Etrt+1 −mt, i.e. the spread be-
tween future expected rates and the current level of the main re￿nancing
rate.8 So, equation (7) may be written as:
st = Etst,t+1 − ϕLt (8)
Therefore, the EONIA spread st depends on two factors, the expecta-
tion of the spread prevailing in the future, computed against the current
level of the main re￿nancing rate, Etst,t+1, and current liquidity condi-
tions, Lt.T h e t e r m Etst,t+1 may re￿ect expected changes in the main
re￿nancing rate during the maintenance period following a monetary
policy decision, or the market￿s expectation of liquidity policy later in
the maintenance period.
Essentially, our approach for the demand side of the model is to
estimate equation (8) to test whether the parameter ϕ is statistically
diﬀerent from zero. One issue which is very relevant in this context
and thoroughly debated in the US literature (see for example Thornton,
2001a) is the simultaneity problem. On a daily basis ￿ the frequency
normally used in the literature on the federal funds market ￿ it is very
diﬃcult to distinguish between demand and supply factors when looking
at the relationship between liquidity and interest rates. This has led
researchers (for example Hamilton, 1997) to use instrumental variable
methods or other econometric techniques to address the simultaneity
problem.
We argue, however, that simultaneity should not be an issue for the
weekly data that we use in the empirical analysis in this paper, given
the time aggregation that we choose. After the MRO allotment which
normally takes place on Tuesday each week, and apart from the net
recourse to the standing facilities (normally signi￿cant only on the very
last day of the maintenance period) and from underbidding episodes9,
the liquidity situation is exogenous for the market and more importantly,
8Until April 1999, the main re￿nancing rate was not at the middle of the corridor,
while it has always been at the middle of the corridor since then. As we do not use
data prior to April 1999, we leave this complication aside in the paper and we refer
only to the case of a symmetric corridor.
9When underbidding occurs at the MROs, banks bid less than the central bank
desires to allot. In this way, the amount of the allotment is actually decided by
the banking system, rather than the central bank. Underbidding occurred only four
times in our sample period.
7for the central bank. In other words, in the days following aM R Oa n d
until the subsequent MRO, the supply of liquidity is determined by the
past MRO allotment and by autonomous factors, and is given for both
market participants and the central bank and not related to interest rate
developments altogether (see Section 2.2 and 3.1 below for more details
on the weekly averaging). So, the overnight rate prevailing in the days
after a MRO allotment and before the subsequent one ￿ which is averaged
over week t, i.e. between day d and day d+j ￿r e ￿ects only excess demand
considerations, or in other words commercial banks￿ behaviour.10 This is
an important departure from the US operational setting, where the Fed
intervenes in the market on a daily basis. Overall, therefore, equation
(8) linking the EONIA spread to the liquidity situation can safely be
interpreted as an excess demand relationship and can be estimated using
OLS techniques.
In the empirical analysis, we have to make assumptions regarding
the measures for the expected overnight rate prevailing in the future
and for the ￿liquidity situation￿, as both variables in equation (8) are
not directly observable. For the expectational term Etst,t+1, we use two
diﬀerent proxies based on short-term rates beyond the overnight matu-
rity, namely the one-week forward rate prevailing in one-week time and
the one-month forward rate prevailing in one-month time. It should be
noted that both rates may be a relatively imprecise estimates of interest
rate expectations prevailing within the maintenance period, as they may
be related to expectations on the level of the main re￿nancing rate in
the subsequent maintenance period, especially in the latter case. Hence,
we also estimate equation (8) including the lagged EONIA spread as a
measure of interest rate expectations, based on the idea that, under the
martingale hypothesis, the EONIA should contain all the information re-
garding interest rate developments within the maintenance period. The
objective is to check the robustness of the estimate of the coeﬃcient ϕ
depending on the assumption for Etst,t+1.
As regards the measure for the ￿liquidity situation￿, Lt, we need
to distinguish between the last week of the maintenance period (i.e.,
after the last MRO of the period) and the remaining weeks.11 In fact,
in the euro area operational framework banks have to ful￿l a reserve
requirement de￿n e di nt e r m so fa naverage over the maintenance period.
So, in the last week the liquidity situation is certainly relevant from
the standpoint of ful￿lling the reserve requirement on average on the
last day. For example, a positive shock to liquidity in the last week
10On this, see also Angelini (2003).
11See Section 2.2 for a more precise de￿nition of the measures used for the ￿liquidity
situation￿ in the euro area.
8is bound to increase the likelihood for the banking system of having a
net recourse to the deposit facility. By contrast, in the other weeks of
the maintenance period the liquidity situation may be relevant only to
the extent that, due to trading frictions, reserve holdings are not fully
substitutable inter-temporally (Taylor, 2001; Bindseil and Seitz, 2001),
or if market participants expect the central bank not to fully correct the
existing liquidity imbalances in one of its subsequent MROs within the
maintenance period.
Against this background, we estimate equation (8) distinguishing
between the last week of the maintenance period (after the last MRO of
the period) and the other weeks, as follows:
st = Etst,t+1 − ϕ1DENDtLt − ϕ2(1 − DENDt)Lt, (9)
where DENDt is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if t is the
last week of the maintenance period, and zero otherwise. On the basis
of the considerations above, it is reasonable to expect ϕ1 to be strongly
signi￿cant in the last week, while the signi￿cance of ϕ2 is uncertain and
depends on the structural features of the euro area money market and
operational setting, in particular whether trading frictions make liquidity
holdings imperfectly substitutable within the maintenance period.12
Overall, equation (9) is the basis of our empirical analysis for the
demand side of the model. The model signals that the central bank can
theoretically aﬀect the overnight rate via two channels, namely expec-
tations of future changes in the interest rate (through ￿open mouth￿
operations) and the current liquidity situation (through open market
operations). However, the distinction between open market and open
mouth operations is less clear-cut if liquidity policy early in the mainte-
nance period can provide credible signals about future monetary policy
decisions within the maintenance period or about liquidity policy in the
last MRO of the maintenance period, i.e. if liquidity policy is inertial
within the maintenance period.13
12In this setting, a possible complication (and a source of possible non-linearity in
the model) is the fact that the EONIA spread is constrained within the upper and
lower bound of the corridor between the standing facilities. However, the overnight
rate usually reaches one of the boundaries of the corridor only in the last hours of
a maintenance period, if at all. On weekly averages, the possible impact of this
non-linearity should be relatively small.
13See Woodford (1999) on the role of policy inertia in steering market expectations
about future policy actions.
92.2 The supply of liquidity in the MROs
2.2.1 The regular supply of liquidity and the ￿liquidity situ-
ation￿ in the euro area
On any day d, the total supply of reserves by the ECB covers the elements
which make up total demand (described thoroughly in ECB, 2002b):
AFd + RR + ERd = MROd + LTROd + FTO d + NMLd (10)
The components of the demand for reserves stem from the so-called
autonomous factors, AFd, of which banknotes in circulation and gov-
ernment deposits are the most important in terms of size and volatility,
the imposed reserve requirement, RR, which is assumed exogenous and
constant over the reserve maintenance period, and ￿nally, some demand
for reserves in excess of the requirement, ERd.14 These demand com-
ponents are similar to what is normally referred to as ￿the need￿ of
the banking system in the US literature (Feinman, 1993). Banks￿ cur-
rent account holdings with their respective national central banks is the
sum of RR and ERd. The bulk of central bank reserves are supplied in
the MROs, MROd, which is the sum of the two outstanding (overlap-
ping) operations, while the longer term re￿nancing operations, LTROd,
are less important in size and void of any monetary policy signal. At
banks￿ own discretion, funds can be obtained or deposited at the end of
a trading session through the marginal lending and the deposit facility
at penalty rates. NMLd is the net marginal lending by the banking
system. Fine-tuning operations, FTO d,m a yb el a u n c h e db yt h eE C B
in exceptional circumstances.
Following closely ECB (2001) and ECB (2002b), the MRO allotment
can be expressed in terms of a central bank target for excess reserves, and
a MRO allotment ensuring ￿neutral￿ liquidity conditions in the market
for reserves would thus seek to meet the ￿normal￿ demand for excess




d + LTROd − Ed(AF d,d+j) − RR (11)
Ed(ER
NORM) is an estimate of the ￿normal￿ average daily demand
for excess reserves over a maintenance period, which typically was around
EUR 0.7 billion in the sample period. Owing to the high level of required
14Bindseil and Setz (2001) comprises a description of the individual liquidity com-
ponents.
15The Federal Reserve tracks a similar expression of expected excess reserves in
the US money market when making its daily decisions on supply of reserves.
10reserves in the euro area, banks have no fundamental reasons for holding
excess reserves such as the liquidity services that they provide at the
margin. So, the demand for excess reserves is due almost entirely to
technical reasons and is normally stable and predictable. AF d,d+j is the
daily average of the autonomous factors from day d until the following
MRO allotment or the end of the maintenance period, whichever is ￿rst.
Thus, j i st h en u m b e ro fd a y sf r o maM R Oo nd a yd in the maintenance
period until the next MRO or the end of the maintenance period. In the
last MRO allotment of a maintenance period, only the days remaining
until the end of the prevailing maintenance period are taken into account
(ECB, 2002b).
The ￿neutral￿ (or ￿benchmark￿) MRO allotment is such that the
probability of having a net recourse to one of the two standing facilities
at the end of the maintenance period is the same, i.e. 1
2. Therefore, under
the neutral allotment the expected overnight rate on the last day of the
maintenance period is the same as the then prevailing main re￿nancing
rate (which is also at the mid point between the standing facilities). If
there are no expectations of a change in the main re￿nancing rate, this
implies that, under the martingale hypothesis, the benchmark allotment
ensures that the current overnight rate is very close to the current main
re￿nancing rate (which is also expected to prevail on the last day of the
maintenance period). However, the situation is not the same if there
are expectations of a change in the main re￿nancing rate before the end
of the maintenance period. In this case, the neutral allotment does not
ensure that the overnight rate is close to the current main re￿nancing
rate, but rather to the main re￿nancing rate which is expected to prevail
on the last day of the maintenance period.
Recalling the variables used in the previous section, we de￿ne the
liquidity situation on day d, Ld, as the diﬀerence between Ed(ERd+j)
and Ed(ER
NORM),w h e r eERd+j is the daily average of the excess re-
serves accumulated from the ￿rst day of the reserve maintenance period
until day d + j. A liquidity situation may be non-neutral due to delib-
erate policy actions or to shocks to autonomous factors. First, ￿non-
neutral￿ liquidity policy actions can be taken by the ECB by supplying
Ed(ERd+j) 6= Ed(ER
NORM), i.e. by deviating from supplying the ex-
pected ￿normal￿ demand for excess reserves. We call these policy actions
Policy d. In particular, when Policy d is positive, the liquidity conditions
a r et a r g e t e dt ob e￿ l o o s e ￿( t h e r ei sa ne x c e s so fr e s e r v e si nt h em a r k e t ) ,
and the opposite holds true if Policyd is negative (there is a shortage
of reserves in the market). A non-neutral policy in the last week, if not
counterbalanced by shocks in the autonomous factors, implies a non-zero
net recourse to the standing facilities on the last day of the maintenance
11period, NMLT, thereby pushing the EONIA rate towards the rate on
one of the standing facilities. Second, shocks to the autonomous factors
may entail deviations of the liquidity situation from the neutral level
between two consecutive MROs, irrespective of the liquidity policy fol-
lowed by the central bank. At the weekly MRO frequency, the liquidity
situation Lt, i.e. the weekly average of Ed(ERd+j) less Ed(ER
NORM),
may thus be decomposed into:
Lt = Policy t + ε
AF
t , (12)
where the subscript t indicates the weekly aggregation (average) be-
tween d and d + j,w h e r ed is the day of the MRO allotment, and εAF
t
is the average shock to the autonomous factors forecast (i.e., εAF
t =
AFt −EdAFt). It should be emphasized that the recourse to the stand-
ing facilities is not included in L, which is a concept close to the ￿non-
borrowed￿ reserves in the US.16
2.2.2 A liquidity reaction function for the central bank
Which considerations drive the liquidity allotment at the MROs? Some
elements aﬀecting the supply of liquidity can be extracted from the
ECB￿s ￿General Documentation￿ (ECB, 2002a):
Open market operations play an important role in the mone-
tary policy of the Eurosystem for the purposes of steering in-
terest rates, managing the liquidity situation in the market and
signalling the stance of monetary policy ( E C B ,2 0 0 2 a ,p .4 )[ e m -
phasis ours]
In the following, we test to what extent this implies a preference for
at least the following two elements: (i) a smooth path of provision of liq-
uidity to banks and (ii) interest rate smoothing within the maintenance
period, minimizing deviations of the very short-term interest rates from
the main re￿nancing rate. For our purpose, these two considerations
could be translated into a simple loss function of the following form,
where the EONIA spread is used as a proxy for the short-term interest
rates relevant for the ECB￿s liquidity policy:
Losst = γPolicy
2
t +( 1− γ)s
2
t, (13)
where γ captures the relative importance attributed to liquidity and
interest rate smoothing. Bindseil (2002) and V￿limaki (2002) present
16Banks typically take recourse to standing facilities to oﬀset liquidity shocks, in
particular towards the end of the maintenance period. Hence, if the use of standing
facilities were included in the liquidity condition measure, L, most liquidity shocks
would not be observed.
12loss functions based on similar considerations.17 In particular, (13) posits
a preference for a ￿smooth￿ provision of liquidity implying that deviating
from the neutral allotment Policy =0is costly for the central bank.
Arguments for the inclusion of this term may be, for instance, that the
central bank ￿nds it desirable to create predictable liquidity conditions
for the market, that some market segments may be favoured unduly
by volatile allotments, and that banks themselves may have preferences
for a relatively smooth pattern of reserve ful￿lment to reduce the risk of
having to catch-up or dispose of funds signi￿cantly on the last days of the
maintenance period. Bindseil (2002) mentions that large ￿uctuations in
total bank reserves may be welfare-reducing as in particular low levels
of reserves reduce the buﬀer against various aggregate and individual
shocks. Concerning interest rates, (13) suggests that the central bank
may seek to reduce deviations of the overnight rate (and other short-term
interest rates) from the main re￿nancing rate in order to support, and
give credibility to, the signalling of the monetary policy stance via the
main re￿nancing rate and the corridor between the rates on the standing
facilities.
It should be noted at this stage that the objectives of liquidity and
interest rate smoothing are normally mutually consistent, because a neu-
tral allotment ￿ especially in the last MRO of the maintenance period
￿ normally ensures that the current overnight rate is very close to the
main re￿nancing rate. A trade-oﬀ between liquidity and interest rate
smoothing, however, may arise if there are expectations of a change in
the main re￿nancing rate within the maintenance period or expectations
of a liquidity imbalance at the end of the period, whereby the EONIA
spread st may be aﬀected by a non-zero expectation term Etst,t+1.I n
this case, if the central bank wanted to signal that the interest rate
expectations might not be warrented, it could try to lean against expec-
tations by conducting an ￿active￿ liquidity policy, i.e. departing from
the neutral allotment Policy t =0 .18 In turn, an active liquidity policy
implies a departure from a smooth provision of liquidity, which may be
costly for the central bank, at least according to equation (13).
Against this background, what is the ￿liquidity reaction function￿ of
the ECB? Some further elements have been provided by the ECB itself:
17Ayuso and Repullo (2001) propose an asymmetric loss function for liquidity
management in the euro area penalising downside deviations of the EONIA from
the middle of the corridor more heavily than upward deviations.
18By contrast, in cases where the central bank itself signalled that a monetary
policy change may be forthcoming, it may be rational for it not to seek to reduce the
spread of market rates from the prevailing policy rate.
13A so-called benchmark allotment can be calculated on the basis
of the liquidity needs. This benchmark constitutes a baseline for
the ECB when making its actual allotment decisions. However,
the ECB may sometimes also have to consider other elements,
such as counterparties￿ bidding behaviour in the MROs and the
divergence of the short term money market interest rates from the
MRO rate,a sw e l la ss o m eexceptional factors creating extraor-
dinary high uncertainty about liquidity forecasts. (ECB, 2002b,
p. 6). [emphasis ours]
So, the central bank aims at ensuring a balanced liquidity situa-
tion, where liquidity is allotted so as to satisfy banks￿ liquidity needs
(Policy t =0 ), but it may also deviate from this ￿benchmark￿ allotment
as a response to ￿uctuations in the EONIA spread (or the spread be-
tween other short-term interest rates and the main re￿nancing rate) as
well as due to exceptional circumstances.
In the following, we test a reaction function very close to those pro-
posed by Feinman (1993) and in particular Taylor (2001) in the US, to
examine whether this is an appropriate starting point for characterizing
liquidity policy also in the euro area. The policy rule is the following:
Policy t = α + βEt−1st,t+1 + θPolicy t−1 + ωDt (14)
A linear relationship between the Policy variable and the interest
rate expectation term Et−1st,t+1 can be derived theoretically directly
from the minimization of the loss function in (13), as shown in Annex
I19. However, the empirical reaction function in (14) is slightly broader
than the theoretical one, as it also includes a constant term, the lagged
Policy and a vector of dummy variables to cater for special episodes.
Assuming that the central bank has a preference for neutral allot-
ments, we would expect the constant term α to be insigni￿cant, i.e. that
the benchmark allotment would prevail on average (Policy=0on aver-
age). If the central bank is seeking to smooth interest rates around the
main re￿nancing rate, as the loss function in (13) also suggests, liquidity
policy reacts to existing interest rate change expectations, Et−1st,t+1. In
fact, the EONIA rate can depart from the main re￿nancing rate due to
either interest rate change expectations or liquidity conditions, as em-
phasized by equation (8). If the coeﬃcient β is positive, the central
19In Annex I the liquidity reaction function which minimizes the central bank loss
function in (13) is derived under discretion, i.e. taking market expectations as given,
hence under the assumption that the central bank cannot credibly commit to follow
a liquidity allotment policy rule. Solving the problem under commitment would raise
complex normative issues which go outside the scope of the current analysis.
14bank leans against interest rate expectations existing prior to the MRO
allotment at time t, thereby smoothing the overnight rate around the
main re￿nancing rate.
It should be emphasized that there is a direct relationship between
the size of the response to existing interest rate expectations (coeﬃcient
β) and central bank preferences. In particular, as discussed in Annex I,
if γ =1(the central bank cares only about liquidity smoothing), we have
β =0 . So, the central bank does not react to interest rate expectations
at all. Conversely, if γ =0(the central bank cares only about interest
rate smoothing) we should have Policy t = 1
ϕEt−1st,t+1, which in turn
implies Et−1st =0at all t. In this case, the central bank uses liquidity
policy exclusively in order to keep the overnight rate exactly at the main
re￿nancing rate.
It is also to be noted that that in our setting liquidity policy reacts
to interest rate expectations with a lag, which ensures that this iden-
ti￿es a supply function and is also appropriate given that Etst,t+1,a
weekly average, is not in the information set of the central bank at the
time of the allotment (the starting point of the weekly period), while
Et−1st,t+1 is (the method for addressing simultaneity was discussed in
greater detail in section 2.1). Taylor (2001) makes a similar assumption
for the Federal Reserve￿s Open Market Desk reaction function.20 In the
empirical analysis, we use four main proxies for prevailing interest rate
change expectations Et−1st,t+1, namely (i) the EONIA, (ii) the two-week
EONIA swap rate, (iii) the one-week forward rate in one week, and (iv)
the one-month forward rate in one month. The considerations outlined
for the demand side of the model regarding the proxies for interest rate
expectations apply also to the supply side of the model. However, for
the supply side of the model only we also add the two-week rate because
t h i si st h es a m em a t u r i t yo ft h eM R O sa n dm a yt h e r e f o r eb er e l e v a n t
from a liquidity policy perspective.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that liquidity policy is inertial in
the maintenance period, if θ > 0. An inertial policy may be justi￿ed,
for instance, if the central bank considers it desirable to convey with its
liquidity policy signals about future liquidity policy in the maintenance
period, consistent with the argument of ￿optimal inertia￿ put forward by,
for instance, Woodford (1999). We also include in the equation dummy
20Orphanides (2001) criticizes Taylor￿s assumption that the lagged federal funds
rate enters in the liquidity reaction function, based on the idea that the Federal
Reserve should react to the future expected federal funds rate, rather than the past
one. This criticism, however, does not apply to our reaction function which is forward-
looking in nature, although based on information available to the central bank prior
to the allotment at time t.
15variables, Dt, to control for some special situations occurring during the
sample period, which we describe in more detail in the next section.
3 The empirical evidence
3.1 The data
Our sample of weekly observations is derived from daily data from 4
January 1999 to 23 November 2002, resulting in 202 weekly observations,
which is the number of MROs carried out in that period. All data
are drawn from ECB sources.21 However, in the analysis we leave out
the ￿rst months of 1999 which marked the beginning of Stage Three
of EMU and may be characterized as a learning period,b o t hf o rt h e
banks and the ECB, in the new environment and operational framework.
Estimates based on these ￿rst months might provide misleading results,
as time series break tests also suggest. Overall, we decide to start our
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Figure 1: EONIA and the middle of the corridor
A key variable in our analysis and for liquidity policy in the euro
area is st, i.e. the EONIA spread. Weekly averages of the EONIA rate
and the main re￿nancing rate are reported in Figure 1 while the EONIA
21The ECB publishes its liquidity data daily on the Reuters ECB40 page together
with weekly forecasts of liquidity needs. Time series of these variables are available
on the ECB website www.ecb.int. By using this data and applying the methodology
outlined in ECB (2001) and (2002b) the liquidity data used in this study can be
roughly replicated. The interest rate measures are available through practically all
￿nancial data providers.
16spread is reported in Figure 2.22 Generally speaking, the EONIA rate
has been very close to the main re￿nancing rate and deviations have
normally been small and temporary, although there are some infrequent
spikes both up and down.
Some key statistics on the EONIA spread are reported in Figure 3.
The average spread was 7 basis points, with a standard deviation of 17
basis points. The spread is highly non-Normal, indicating the impor-
tance of some large outliers in the distribution, and is also skewed (the
median spread is slightly lower, at 5 basis points). Moreover, standard













Figure 2: Spread between EONIA and the middle of the corridor
As a measure of interest rate expectations for the demand side of
the model, Etst,t+1, we consider the lagged EONIA spread as well as the
spread between two short-term rates and the main re￿nancing rate, in
particular (i) the one-week forward rate prevailing in one-week time and
(ii) the one-month forward rate prevailing in one-month time. These
forward rates are computed from EONIA swap interest rates. As noted
previously, for the supply equation we also test the use of the two-week
EONIA swap rate.
Coming to the liquidity variables, the dependent variable of the sup-
ply equation, Policy t, measures the diﬀerence between the target daily
average reserve surplus decided by the ECB at each MRO for the next al-
lotment (determined when the allotment decision is made) and a bench-
mark value, which is an estimate of the ￿normal￿ daily average reserve
22Please note that we assume that changes to the main re￿nancing rate take eﬀect
the day after their announcement (the day that changes to the standing facilities are












Mean        0.070261
Median    0.052429
Maximum   0.838750
Minimum -0.570000
Std. Dev.    0.171993
Skewness    0.876470
Kurtosis    10.75865
Jarque-Bera  453.4309
Probability  0.000000
Figure 3: Key statistics on the spread between EONIA and the middle
of the corridor
surplus demanded by the banking system over a maintenance period
(EUR 0.7 billion in the sample period). This variable is thus already of
a weekly frequency, occurring on the allotment day of a given MRO, and
no time aggregation is required. When liquidity policy is neutral, the
target daily average reserve surplus minus the ￿normal￿ demand for ex-
cess reserves, Policy t would be zero. Otherwise, a negative value would
signal a tight allotment and a positive value a loose one. In addition,
we also consider the average forecast error on the autonomous factors,
εAF
t , obtained as an aggregation of daily forecast errors compared with
the internal ECB forecasts.23 A positive value of εAF
t implies looser than
neutral liquidity conditions. Figure 4 reports the Policy variable and
the forecast errors for the autonomous factors, which are the two com-
ponents of the overall liquidity situation variable Lt = Policy t +εAF
t . It
can be seen from the chart that there are a few outliers in the Policy
series, but ￿uctuations are otherwise quite contained.
The key statistics for these ￿liquidity situation￿ variables, reported
in Figures 5 and 6, show that conditions have been balanced on average,
indicating that liquidity policy has been neutral over a long period of
time.
The neutral character of liquidity policy is con￿rmed by looking at
the net recourse to the marginal lending facility (where positive values
indicate that the recourse to the marginal lending facility were larger
23Note that we assume that the forecast for the autonomous factors of the central
bank and of the market is the same. While this is not necessarily always true, there










Figure 4: Demand and supply variables: the two components of the
liquidity situation, Policy and autonomous factor shocks
than that to the deposit facility), which has also been very close to zero
on average (see Figures 7 and 8 ).
Furthermore, in the analysis we also use a set of dummy variables
to control for some special episodes which occurred during our sample
p e r i o d ,a sw e l la st h ed u m m yv a r i a b l eDENDt w h i c hi su s e dt od i f -
ferentiate the last week of the maintenance period from previous weeks
for our main variables, as explained ealier in the paper. The dummy
variables for special episodes are the following:
￿ Dummy for the underbidding episodes of 13 February, 10 April, 9
October and 6 November 2001.
￿ Dummy for the end of the month. It picks the MRO closest to the
end of the month, generally the ￿rst or second MRO of the main-
tenance period, during 1999 and 2000 (it was found not signi￿cant
for 2001 and 2002).
￿ Dummies assuming the value one on 6 March and 24 April 2001
where the allotments were anomalous due to the diverging size of
the two outstanding MROs.
￿ Dummy that picks the allotments on 20 February, 18 April, and
16 October 2001 where the ECB only partially covered for the liq-
uidity shortfall stemming from the underbidding in the preceeding













Mean        0.100988
Median    0.070000
Maximum   8.200000
Minimum -9.100000
Std. Dev.    1.536080
Skewness   -2.165287
Kurtosis    22.16802
Jarque-Bera  2767.529
Probability  0.000000











Mean        0.061621
Median    0.024286
Maximum   3.993077
Minimum -2.491429
Std. Dev.    0.725454
Skewness    1.020934
Kurtosis    10.14196
Jarque-Bera  395.4338
Probability  0.000000
Figure 6: Key statistics on the autonomous factor shocks variable
￿ Dummies for ￿ne-tuning operations picking the MRO allotments
on 11 January 2000, 27 June 2000, and 8 and 15 January 2002 suc-
ceeding the weeks of ￿ne-tuning (the ￿ne-tuning the 18 September
2001 is accounted for below).
￿ Dummy that picks the allotment on 18 September 2001 following
the terrorist attacks in the US.
￿ Dummy that assumes the value one in the MROs in the mainte-
nance periods of third quarter 1999, in which the ECB generally
allotted ample liquidity to counter overbidding.










Figure 7: Net recourse to the marginal lending facility (Positive values
indicate that the recourse to the marginal lending facility were larger
than that to the deposit facility)
￿ Dummy taking a value of one for the allotment on 28 December
2001, the last tender of the year 2001, immediately prior to the
cash changeover.
￿ Dummy that assumes the value one on 22 January 2002, the last
MRO of the maintenance period ending on the 23 January 2002,
which was aﬀected by the cash changeover.
For the variables used in the empirical analysis, the weekly aggrega-
tion (i.e., from frequency d to frequency t) is carried out as reported in
detail in the Chart in Annex II. The liquidity variable εAF
t is aggregated
as the daily average between the settlement day of the MRO and the
allotment day of the following MRO, or the last day of the maintenance
period (whatever comes ￿rst). Because interest rates may be aﬀected
by liquidity policy already on the allotment day, we aggregate all in-
terest rate measures (in particular, st and the proxies for Etst,t+1 and
Et−1st,t+1)b e t w e e nt h eallotment day and the announcement day of the
subsequent MRO.
The fact that we aggregate daily data in this way implies that not
a l lw e e k l yo b s e r v a t i o n ss p a ne x a c t l ys e v e nd a y s .T h ew e e k l yo b s e r v a t i o n
which refers to the last week of the maintenance period, in fact, aggre-
gates over a variable number of days (around 3.5 days on average). Be-
cause we have designed the demand and supply models as linear models















Mean        0.229250
Median    0.017000
Maximum   19.20300
Minimum -33.39900
Std. Dev.    4.097907
Skewness   -2.554243
Kurtosis    34.45982
Jarque-Bera  7280.020
Probability  0.000000
Figure 8: Key statistics on the net recourse to the marginal lending
facility
our results to a signi￿cant extent. However, in the demand function
this time aggregation is an issue if the eﬀect of the liquidity is larger on
the very last day of the maintenance period, as some empirical evidence
appears to suggest (Moschitz, 2002; W￿rtz, 2003). The weight of the
last day is larger, the shorter the last week of the maintenance period.
So, to the extent that this is the case our results should indicate the
average eﬀect of the liquidity situation onto the EONIA spread, i.e. for
a hypothetical last week of 3.5 days.
3.2 Estimation and results
3.2.1 The excess demand for liquidity
Table 1 in Annex II reports the results of estimating the demand equa-
tion in (9) using simple OLS making three diﬀerent assumptions for
the interest rate expectations terms, Etst,t+1, as reported in the previ-
ous section. The estimates in the table treat the liquidity situation as
due to Policy and to shocks to the autonomous factors, εAF
t , separately
in order to distinguish between policy-induced liquidity imbalances and
those resulting from stochastic shocks to liquidity. It is interesting to
note, in particular, that the measure of interest rate expectations based
on the lagged value of the EONIA spread st−1 (￿r s tc o l u m no nt h el e f ti n
Table 1) gives satisfactory results, also in terms of diagnostic statistics
(reported in the lower part of the table). There is no evidence of serial
correlation and ARCH eﬀects in the residuals. While the RESET test
indicates that there is some sign of residual non-linearity in the model,
22this is not the case when estimating the same function based on Lt,
i.e. without separating Policyand εAF
t (see following Table 2), although
the test is close to be signi￿cant also in this case. Furthermore, tests
of the residuals against the explanatory variables shows no presence of
non-linearities and thus supports the linear approximation.24 Whereas
the Jarque-Bera test consistently signals the presence of non-Normality
in the residuals, it has to be taken into account that it is normally dif-
￿cult to obtain Normal residuals with high frequency data. Breakpoint
Chow tests tend to suggest that all models in Table 1 are relatively sta-
ble. In particular, there is no sign that the switch to the variable rate
tender system in June 2000 has changed the parameters of the demand
function to any statistically signi￿cant extent. Overall, the model in-
cluding st−1 as a measure of interest rate expectations can be considered
as the ￿benchmark￿ model for the demand side of the model, due to its
simplicity and satisfactory diagnostic statistics.
The main message arising from the results in the table is that the
liquidity situation, as proxied by the Policy and εAF
t variables, has had
as t r o n ga n ds i g n i ￿cant impact on the EONIA spread only after the last
MRO of the maintenance period. The estimate of this liquidity eﬀect
is remarkably consistent across measures of interest rate expectation,
ranging between -0.31 and -0.41. Moreover, we do not ￿nd a statisti-
cally signi￿cant diﬀerence between the impact of liquidity shocks arising
from Policy and from autonomous factors, εAF
t . When estimating the
equation using the Lt variable for total liquidity shocks (as done in Table
2), we ￿nd that the eﬀect on the last week of the maintenance period is
−0.37, while for previous MROs it is a mere −0.02 , both of which are
statistically signi￿cant. Overall, these results imply that a shortage from
the ￿normal￿ average daily demand for excess reserves (around EUR 0.7
billion) of, say, EUR 1 billion in the last week of the maintenance pe-
riod leads to an increase in the average EONIA spread by around 37
basis points.25 By contrast, liquidity eﬀects are found to be marginal for
24We also try to include a non-linear term L2
t in the demand equation to cater for
possible non-linearity eﬀects (not shown for brevity), ￿nding that such non-linearities
are statistically signi￿cant but very small and do not improve the overall ￿to ft h e
equation to a noticeable extent. So, we prefer to stick to the more tractable linear
approximation.
25The magnitude of the estimated liquidity eﬀect after the last MRO of the main-
tenance period is comparable to previous estimates. Studies using daily data have
found an impact on the EONIA of roughly 4 basis points from a EUR 1 billion liquid-
ity imbalance on the last day of the period (Bindseil and Seitz, 2001; W￿rtz, 2003).
If the impact on the EONIA occurred entirely on the last day of the maintenance
period, the average weekly impact of 37 basis points would translate into an impact
of 4.3 basis points from a EUR 1 billion liquidity imbalance on the last day of the
period (dividing by 30 days translates a EUR 1 billion daily average imbalance into
23shocks taking place before the last MRO of the maintenance period. The
same EUR 1 billion liquidity imbalance would move the EONIA spread
by only 2 basis points on average, based on our estimates.
In Table 2 in Annex II we report the results when estimating the
benchmark equation using Lt for all liquidity shocks, not distinguishing
between Policy and εAF
t , as mentioned above. In parallel, we check
whether a variable capturing the deviation in the number of days from
the average number of days of the last week of the maintenance period
matters in determining the slope of the demand curve in that week. As
noted in Section 3.1, the argument would be that in a shorter/longer last
week the weight of the very last day ￿ where the bulk of the liquidity
eﬀect is presumably concentrated ￿ would be bigger/smaller, and this
might aﬀect the slope of the demand function. However, we ￿nd this
variable to have a very small and statistically insigni￿cant impact (see
Table 2, right column).
Further insight on the benchmark demand function may be gained
by looking at the stability analysis, which is reported in Figure 10. Re-
cursive residuals and the CUSUM test show no sign of instability in
the benchmark demand function. At the same time, a few outliers are
visible in the residuals chart shown in Figure 9, which are related to
some speci￿c circumstances which occurred during the sample period.
In particular, these episodes refer to underbidding in 2001 and to two
very special circumstances, namely the terrorist attacks on 11 Septem-
ber 2001 and the cash changeover related eﬀects at the end of 2001 and
in the maintenance period ending on 23 January 2002.
To check the robustness of the results of the benchmark demand
function to these special episodes, in Table 3 in Annex II we report
an estimate of the model including diﬀerent sets of dummy variables.
Moreover, we also separate positive and negative values of Lt to check
for the possible presence of asymmetric eﬀects. In the ￿rst column on
the left, we simply present the equation with the asymmetry, where
we ￿nd evidence of a relatively stronger eﬀect of positive values than of
negative values of Lt. However, this evidence of asymmetry should not be
overemphasized because we have relatively few episodes of large negative
values of Lt in our sample period, possibly leading to a small sample bias
problem in this estimate. This is also con￿rmed when controlling for the
￿no bail-out￿ allotments pursued by the ECB following in particular
three underbidding episodes in the course of 2001, which have generally
resulted in large negative values of Lt (second column from the left). In
a EUR 1 billion imbalance on the last day and then assuming that the average last










Figure 9: Actual and ￿tted values of the EONIA spread in the ￿bench-
mark ￿demand equation
this case, negative values of Lt are not even signi￿cant in the estimate,
indicating a sensitivity to a few observations due to small sample bias.
In the subsequent columns, we also dummy out the eﬀect of the terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001, the year-end eﬀect in 2001 and the cash
changeover, as well as the three ￿no bail-out￿ episodes separately, rather
than together.
The inclusion of these dummy variables does not change the qualita-
tive conclusion of the analysis, namely that liquidity imbalances matter
for the EONIA spread to a signi￿cant extent only after the last MRO of
the maintenance period. At the same time, we ￿nd evidence of a rela-
tively strong asymmetry in the eﬀect of liquidity shocks in the last week
of the maintenance period, with negative shocks (tight policy) aﬀecting
the EONIA spread proportionally less than positive shocks (loose pol-
icy). So, it seems that a ￿squeeze￿ in liquidity has a smaller eﬀect on
the EONIA than a loosening of conditions. This is an interesting result
which appears to be diﬃcult to justify based on purely rational consid-
erations, but which might be, as noted, due to a small sample bias and
s h o u l dt h e r e f o r eb et r e a t e dw i t hs o m ec a u t i o n . 26
26An explanation of the ￿nding, which could be consistent with rationality, is that,
as the interest rate decreases (following a positive liquidity shock), more banks may
see little marginal bene￿t from managing their reserves actively and may simply use
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Figure 10: Recursive residuals and CUSUM tests of the ￿bench-
mark￿demand equation
All in all, the results of the analysis of the demand function indi-
cate that there is a consistent pattern in all estimates which points to a
strong eﬀect of liquidity after the last MRO of the maintenance period,
with a coeﬃcient of around -0.37. By contrast, the eﬀect of the liquid-
ity situation variables on the EONIA spread is marginal or non-existing
before the last MRO of the maintenance period. This feature is likely to
re￿ect both structural features of the euro area money market as well as
the market￿s perception of the ECB￿s liquidity policy within the main-
tenance period. First, the level of the reserve requirement in the euro
area and the possibility of averaging is likely to imply that the liquidity
services provided by an additional unit of reserves has been practically
zero before the end of the maintenance period (banks are ￿satiated￿
with reserves). So, a liquidity imbalance (for example a shortage of re-
serves) early in the maintenance period, at least of the relatively limited
size observed so far, has had no eﬀect on the price of liquidity, i.e. the
overnight rate. The result also suggests that the reserve requirement
with averaging provision has been successful in cushioning eﬀects from
liquidity imbalances until the very last days of the maintenance period.
Second, market participants most likely expected the ECB to be ap-
proximately neutral in the last MRO of the maintenance period (see the
next Section), namely to correct any early imbalance in liquidity later
in the maintenance period. The consequence of this is that a liquidity
26imbalance early in the maintenance period was seen as having no bearing
on the expected liquidity situation in the last week (more precisely, on
the last day) of the maintenance period, which is what matters for the
current overnight rate under the martingale hypothesis. This interpre-
tation is supported especially by the observation that the liquidity eﬀect
is found to be very small before the last MRO of the maintenance period
across all measures of interest rate expectations, irrespective of whether
they span the current maintenance period (the lagged EONIA spread)
or the following one (the one-month forward rate in one month).
Summing up, the demand for liquidity in the euro area can be rep-
resented by the following function at a weekly frequency (dropping in-
signi￿cant terms for simplicity):
st =0 .06 + 0.14st−1 − 0.37LtDENDt − 0.02Lt(1 − DENDt), (15)
where 0.06 (six basis points) may be seen as a crude measure of the
￿natural spread￿ between the EONIA rate and the main re￿nancing
rate.27
3.2.2 The supply of liquidity
Turning to the supply of liquidity, several money market rates are used
to proxy the expectation for the future EONIA spread, Et−1st,t+1.T a b l e
4 in Annex II reports the results of a simple OLS estimation of equation
(14) for the three alternatives; the EONIA, the two-week EONIA swap
rate, and the one-month forward rate in one month calculated from
EONIA swap rates, all of them computed as a spread over the main
re￿nancing rate, as already mentioned in previous sections.
Unanimously, the estimations con￿rm that β is signi￿cant and pos-
itive and that the constant α is not signi￿cant. The coeﬃcient to the
lagged dependent variable, θ,i ss i g n i ￿cant and positive only in the spec-
i￿cation using the EONIA, however, also in that case the coeﬃcient is
very small. In the speci￿cations using other interest rate proxies the co-
eﬃcient is insigni￿cant. Hence, there appears to have been no systematic
inertia in the liquidity policy of the ECB in the sample period. This is
also in line with the results of the demand side of the model suggesting
that Policy does not aﬀect interest rates before the last MRO of the
maintenance period.
We ￿nd that the one-month forward rate in one month dominated
the one-week forward rate in one week, which is therefore not reported in
Table 4. While the one-week forward rate may contain more information
about expectations for rate changes within the maintenance period, it
27W￿rtz (2003) uses a highly parameterised daily model and ￿nds a natural spread
of around 2.5 basis points.
27is also more prone to short-term noise. The one-month forward rate, al-
though containing expectations for changes in the main re￿nancing rate
and the interest rate corridor beyond the prevailing maintenance period,
may nevertheless be a somewhat more reliable proxy for the expecta-
tions within the prevailing period. For the one-month forward rate, we
also ￿nd that the observation on the announcement day carried higher
explanatory power than the average of the rate over the previous week.
For the two-week spot rate and the EONIA, the opposite holds true. For
the spot rates, the average of the past week entailed a stronger explana-
tory value, indicating that the weekly average may be a more reliable
signal of market conditions than the single value on the announcement
day.28
When ranking the estimations with the alternative interest rate prox-
ies by the information criteria, the estimation based on the lagged EO-
NIA spread dominates the alternatives, although the diﬀerence is small.
The short-term forward rates contain important information on market
expectations for the future path of the main re￿nancing rate. However,
the overnight maturity may be at least as important for the ECB since,
under the martingale hypothesis, the overnight rate may contain all the
relevant information for the central bank regarding market expectations
for liquidity conditions and interest rates in the remainder of the main-
tenance period. Furthermore, while the overnight rate possibly can be
aﬀected by changing the liquidity conditions, the forward rates spanning
beyond the current maintenance period may probably only be aﬀected
very indirectly by MRO allotments, if the central bank could provide
credible signals about future monetary policy moves in its allotments.
For the estimation based on the EONIA spread, we ￿nd the coeﬃ-
cient β to be 2.12. This implies that, say, a positive EONIA spread of
10 basis points would have led to a MRO allotment, or more speci￿cally
Ed(ERd+j), which on average would have been around EUR 0.2 billion
higher than the expected ￿normal￿ average daily demand for excess re-
serves Ed(ER
NORM). Using the spot and forward interest rates with
the slightly longer maturities, the coeﬃcient β decreases but remains
positive and signi￿cant, which is a good sign for the robustness of the
analysis.
Giving prominence to the results for the EONIA spread, equation
(14) translates into the following simple function for the supply of liq-
uidity in the weekly MROs (the vector of dummies is described below):
Policy t =2 .12st−1 + ωDt (16)
28Since the allotment decision is made in the morning, the most recent EONIA
observation is that on the announcement day.
28We ￿nd that there has been no signi￿cant diﬀerence between the
liquidity policy reaction to interest rates in the last MRO of the mainte-
nance period and in the preceeding MROs.29 This may appear surprising
since, taken from the demand equation, no eﬀect on interest rates from
deviating from a benchmark allotment should be expected in the MROs
prior to the end of the maintenance period.
We ￿nd an asymmetric response to positive and negative spreads of
the overnight rate over the main re￿nancing rate with a larger reaction
to positive spreads. However, as already mentioned for the demand side,
there are very few observations of a negative spread in the sample pe-
riod and about half of these occurrances led to underbidding for which
dummies are attached in the supply equation.30.T h et e s tw a sa l s oc o n -
ducted using the crude measure of the ￿natural￿ spread of 6 basis points
from the demand equation (the constant) as the pivotal point instead
of zero, and this con￿rmed the result on asymmetry. This is perhaps
not surprising. EONIA spread observations between zero and 6 basis
points have probably been regarded more as ￿on track￿ than a situation
which should have elicited active liquidity management to spur an in-
crease in rates. The asymmetry in the observations of the interest rates
pertains to some extent to the presence of the minimum bid rate, which
sets a ￿oor to the two-week MRO tender rates. The asymmetry in ten-
der rates within the corridor also aﬀects rates in the secondary market.
By testing the relation with quadratic terms in order to capture pos-
sible non-linearities, we ￿nd no indications that large deviations in the
overnight rate from the main re￿nancing rate have carried a particularly
high weight for the central bank. We also test for a structural break as-
sociated to the switch from ￿xed to variable rate tenders in June 2000,
and ￿nd that there appears to have been no signi￿cant diﬀerence in the
29We omit the liquidity policy reaction in the ￿rst MROs of the maintenance period
in the estimation based on the EONIA. The lagged interest rate observation associ-
ated with these MROs covers the last days of the previous maintenance period. The
spike in rates which often occur on these days due to accumulated liquidity imbal-
ances is not likely to be relevant for the MRO decision in the following maintenance
period. By constructing an alternative EONIA spread measure, which deviates by
using the average rate in the days from the start of the maintenance period until the
￿rst MRO instead of the average rate from the last days of the previous maintenance
period, the liquidity policy reaction to the EONIA spread proves to be similar to
the reaction in the other MROs. However, we choose to employ the original EONIA
spread measure for both the demand and supply side to allow for a joint determi-
nation (the EONIA spread evolution on the last days of a maintenance period is
important for the demand side of the model).
30Note that spikes in rates between the last MRO of a maintenance period and the
end of the period are not considered in the EONIA spread variable relevant for the
supply equation, as mentioned in the previous footnote.










Figure 11: Actual and ￿tted values of policy in the main supply function
Furthermore, we consider the inclusion of a number of dummies con-
trolling for extraordinary conditions which occurred during our sample
period. Figure 11 shows the actual and ￿tted values of Policy in the
main supply equation were the visible outliers are tracked by the con-
sidered dummies. The most relevant dummies seem to be related to the
underbidding episodes, and in particular the no-bail-out responses from
the ECB, in 2001, and two MROs in which the ECB restored the balance
between the sizes of the two outstanding MROs. Also, a dummy vari-
able controls for a period in the autumn of 1999 characterized by consis-
tently ample liquidity provision to counter overbidding (ECB, 2002b).
Furthermore, observations aﬀected by ￿ne-tuning operations and end-
of-year eﬀects are also pinned down by dummy variables. Finally, we
identify a dummy with a positive coeﬃcient for the MROs close to the
end-of-month in 1999 and 2000. This dummy may be explained by some
sensitivity to tensions in the money market related to the end-of-month
eﬀects and possibly also some preference for frontloading the provision
of liquidity. However, this eﬀect appears to have been relevant only for
1999 and 2000, whereas it is found to be insigni￿cant for 2001 and 2002.
To examine the robustness of the coeﬃcient β, the estimation is also
conducted omitting completely the vector of dummies. This results in
an estimate of β of 2.06, which is statistically indistinguishable from the










Figure 12: Recursive residuals and CUSUM tests of the main supply
equation
There are generally no problems of residual non-linearity in the esti-
mations according to RESET tests, neither are the estimations distorted
by serial correlation of the residuals. As for the demand side, we test
the residuals against the explanatory variables and ￿nd support for the
linear approximation. Non-Normal residuals are present, as for the de-
mand equation, but this again seems unavoidable with high frequency
data. The ARCH Lagrange multiplier test shows that the standardised
residuals contain no ARCH eﬀects. Recursive residuals and CUSUM
tests are diﬃcult to calculate due to the near-singular matrices originat-
ing from the dummies. In Figure 12, the tests are shown omitting the
￿ne-tuning dummies to reduce the number of parameters and allow for
a longer test period (April 2001 until November 2002). For this period,
there are no signs of instability in the estimated equation.
4 Discussion of the results
The results of the previous analysis suggests a simple demand-supply
characterization of the behaviour of the euro area money market, as
follows:
Demand: st =0 .06 + 0.14st−1 − 0.37LtDENDt − 0.02Lt(1 − DENDt)
(17)
Supply: Policy t =2 .12st−1 + ωDt (18)
Some interesting considerations may be derived from this simple
31model. A main conclusion of this analysis, in particular, is that the
ECB had a strong preference for providing a neutral liquidity allotment
in the considered sample period. In normal conditions, this has generally
implied also that the EONIA spread was close to zero, i.e. that the main
re￿nancing rate was the actual anchor for the monetary policy stance in
the euro area. However, as noted above, expectations of a change in the
main re￿nancing rate during the maintenance period create a situation
in which liquidity and interest rate smoothing cannot be accomplished
simultaneously and a compromise between the two objectives has to be
taken. Our estimates suggest that, in such cases, leaning against interest
rate expectations has not played a signi￿cant role in the ECB￿s liquidity
policy in the ￿rst four years of Stage Three of EMU (in other words,
γ was close to one). Indeed, before the last MRO of the maintenance
period the reaction of liquidity policy to existing interest rate change
expectations, however measured, has been far too weak to oﬀset their
impact on the EONIA spread, also considering the very small impact of
liquidity imbalances onto the EONIA spread apart from the last week of
the maintenance period, as estimated in the demand side of the model.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that an upward impact of
10 basis points due to expectations of a change in the main re￿nancing
rate later on prompted a loose liquidity allotment by EUR 0.2 billion
which, taking into account the results for the demand side of the model,
implies a reduction in the EONIA spread by only 0.4 basis points before
the last MRO of the maintenance period. Theoretically, the eﬀect on
the EONIA spread would be larger in the last MRO, but at this point
of the maintenance period there were usually no interest rate change ex-
pectations prevailing anymore, due to the fact that Governing Council
meetings have seldom been in the last week of the maintenance period
in our sample period.
The apparently scant use of ￿active￿ liquidity policy to stabilize
the EONIA around the main re￿nancing rate, which departs from the
US Federal Reserve practice as emphasised by Taylor (2001), is con-
sistent with a scheme between the ￿dealing rate model￿ and the ￿open
mouth approach￿ (Manna, Pill and Quiros, 2001), in which the overnight
rate is not a policy objective. Monetary policy signalling was in fact
achieved through the main re￿nancing rate, and the determination of
the overnight rate was left primarily to market forces. Indeed, pegging
the overnight rate at all points in time to the main re￿nancing rate has
not been a policy objective for the ECB. This possibly also suggests that
spreads observed in the market were in line with signals provided by the
ECB about its future policy. At the same time, it has to be taken into
account that the liquidity reaction function that we estimate took place
32in an environment of generally low volatility of short-term interest rates
and orderly money market trading conditions. So, the lack of a very
￿active￿ liquidity policy during the ￿rst four years of EMU might be
explained not only by the ECB￿s preferences, but also at least in part by
the conditions under which this policy was carried out. As mentioned
earlier, in the absence of pronounced interest rate change expectations,
interest rate and liquidity smoothing are mutually consistent objectives.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided a simple weekly model of the demand and sup-
ply of liquidity in the euro area, close to the analysis by Taylor (2001)
on the federal funds market in the United States. The paper reaches
the following conclusions. From a demand perspective, the analysis in
this paper ￿nds that the liquidity situation appears to have mattered
t oas i g n i ￿cant extent only in the last week of the maintenance period,
and to have had a negligible eﬀect earlier in the maintenance period.
This ￿nding presumably re￿ects both the structural features of the euro
area money market, in particular the level of the reserve requirement
which makes reserves void of liquidity services at the margin, and mar-
ket participants￿ perception that the ECB￿s liquidity policy is neutral at
the end of the maintenance period. Indeed, from the supply side of the
model we ￿nd that the ECB￿s liquidity policy has been normally neutral.
There appears to have been some reaction to deviations of the overnight
rate from the main re￿nancing rate, but the reaction has been small
on average over the sample period. Overall, liquidity smoothing can be
characterized as the main objective of the ECB￿s liquidity policy during
the ￿rst four years of EMU. One interpretation of this result may be
that the operational framework of the ECB has worked satisfactorily in
k e e p i n gt h eE O N I Ac l o s et ot h em a i nr e ￿nancing rate without the need
for a more active liquidity policy. Furthermore, there may have been
occasions where deviations of short-term rates from the then prevailing
main re￿nancing rate emerged after the ECB signalled a monetary policy
change in the future.
Our analysis is mainly descriptive and does not assess the welfare
consequences of the liquidity policy which we observe. However, the
analysis provides a simple framework for addressing such issues and the
derivation of a liquidity policy rule which is optimal from a welfare per-
spective is the natural extension of this analysis. This extension might
be aimed at dealing with fundamental issues such as the relative weight
of interest rate and liquidity smoothing in the liquidity management￿s
ideal loss function, which have been touched upon only casually in the
literature and yet represent an interesting topic for research in this ￿eld.
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35Annex I: Derivation of the empirical linear reac-
tion function in (14)
In the setting of our model, the central bank is assumed to minimize
the expected value of the loss function in (13), based on the information
set available at time t − 1, namely:
Et−1Losst = γPolicy
2
t + Et−1(1 − γ)s
2
t (19)
Noting that, from (8) and taking into account that Et−1εAF














Solving the problem for the mimimum loss under discretion, the ￿rst
order condition for Policy is:
2[γ +( 1− γ)ϕ




[γ +( 1− γ)ϕ2]
Et−1st,t+1 (23)
Note that, if γ =1(the central bank cares only about liquidity
smoothing), we obtain Policy t =0 , as mentioned in the text. Conversely,
if γ =0(the central bank cares only about interest rate smoothing) we
have Policy t = 1
ϕEt−1st,t+1, which (from (8)) implies Et−1st =0at all t.
Calling β =
(1−γ)
[γ+(1−γ)ϕ2], we obtain a reaction function very similar to
the one proposed in (14). In the reaction function in (14) we also include
a constant and a smoothing term, as well as some dummy variables
to control for special episodes. So, the empirical reaction function in
(14) is slightly more general than the theoretical one proposed in (23);
nonetheless, it remains theoretically consistent.
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Chart: Weekly averaging of daily data in the maintenance period (MP)
Start of      End of
MP           MP
Policy t Policy t+1 Policy t+2      Policy t+3
Interest rate variables Interest rate variables Interest rate variables    Interest rate
at time t at time t+1 at time t+2    variables t+3
   (days ignored       (not used in the
    in averaging)     supply equation)
Announce MRO 1 Announce MRO 2 Announce MRO 3 Announce MRO 4
Allot MRO 1 Allot MRO 2 Allot MRO 3         Allot MRO 4
      Settle MRO 1      Settle MRO 2      Settle MRO 3           Settle MRO4
Liquidity variables Liquidity variables Liquidity variables      Liquidity
at time t at time t+1 at time  t+2      variables t+3
Policy t             Policy t+1 Policy t+2       Policy t+3
  The interest rate variables￿ daily observations are averaged from the allotment day to the following announcement day.
  The Policy variable shows the target daily average reserve surplus at the next allotment or the end of the maintenance period, whichever comes first, decided on
the allotment day, minus the estimate of ￿natural￿ reserve surplus.
  The Liquidity variable reflects the expected daily average reserve surplus at the next allotment or the end of the maintenance period (how the policy target
￿evolves￿ reflecting the evolution of autonomous factors) minus the estimate of ￿natural￿ reserve surplus. Daily observations are averaged from the settlement
day to the following allotment day. The autonomous factor shocks variable is then derived as the difference between Liquidity and Policy, on a weekly basis,
excluding the use of standing facilities.Annex II ￿ Chart and Tables
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Table 1 ￿ OLS estimation of the demand equation using different interest rate measures; (t-statistics) and [critical values] in brackets
The dependent variable is the EONIA spread (estimation sample from 3 August 1999 to 23 November 2002)
Lagged EONIA spread
￿Benchmark￿ model
Spread between 1w/1w forward
rate and the main refinancing rate
Spread between 1m/1m forward
rate and the main refinancing rate
Constant 0.06 (4.98) 0.06 (5.24) 0.06 (4.86)
Measure of interest rate expectations 0.14 (2.20) 0.11 (1.69) 0.11 (2.10)
Policy in the last MRO of the MP -0.37 (-7.63) -0.40 (-8.07) -0.41 (-8.20)
Policy in the previous MROs to the last of the MP -0.02 (-3.12) -0.02 (-2.99) -0.02 (-3.25)
Autonomous factor shocks ( 
AF ) in the last week of the MP -0.33 (-3.20) -0.32 (-3.03) -0.31 (-2.96)
 
AF in the previous weeks to the last in the MP 0.00 (0.15) -0.00 (-0.11) 0.00 (0.10)
R squared 0.33 0.32 0.33
DW Serial correlation 1.91 1.69 1.6
Autocorrelation AR 1-2 test:  F(2,164) = 0.55250 [0.5766] F(2,164) = 2.1371 [0.1213] F(2,164) = 2.5771 [0.0791]
Normality test:    Chi^2(2) = 102.02 [0.0000]** Chi^2(2) = 123.96 [0.0000]** Chi^2(2) = 144.37 [0.0000]**
ARCH 1-1 test:  F(1,164) = 3.3369 [0.0696] F(1,164) = 3.4491 [0.0651] F(1,164) = 3.5350 [0.0619]
RESET test:  F(1,165) = 5.0616 [0.0258]* F(1,165) = 7.4765 [0.0069]** F(1,165) = 9.4711 [0.0024]**Annex II ￿ Chart and Tables
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Table 2 ￿ OLS estimation of the ￿benchmark￿ demand equation, testing for non-equally spaced observations; (t-statistics) and [critical values] in
brackets 
The dependent variable is the EONIA spread (estimation sample from 3 August 1999 to 23 November 2002)
Constant 0.06 (5.18) 0.06 (5.12)
Lagged EONIA spread 0.13 (1.99) 0.13 (2.00)
Liquidity (Policy +  
AF) in the last MRO of the MP -0.37 (-8.04) -0.36 (-7.42)
Liquidity (Policy +  
AF) in the last MRO of the MP * the
deviation in days from the average number
- -0.01 (-0.38)
Liquidity in the previous weeks to the last in the MP -0.02 (-2.76) -0.02 (-2.75)
R squared 0.32 0.32
DW Serial correlation 1.91 1.91
Autocorrelation AR 1-2 test:  F(2,166) =  0.55452 [0.5754] F(2,165) =  0.59351 [0.5536]
Normality test:    Chi^2(2) =   102.33 [0.0000]** Chi^2(2) =   107.26 [0.0000]**
ARCH 1-1 test:  F(1,166) =   3.8306 [0.0520] F(1,165) =   3.6887 [0.0565]
RESET test:  F(1,167) =   3.6142 [0.0590] F(1,166) =   4.0467 [0.0459]*Annex II ￿ Chart and Tables
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Table 3 ￿ Symmetry and sensitivity of the ￿benchmark￿ demand equation to outliers in the dataset using OLS estimation;  (t-statistics) and [critical
values] in brackets 
The dependent variable is the EONIA spread (estimation sample from 3 August 1999 to 23 November 2002)
Constant 0.07 (6.22) 0.08 (7.11) 0.08 (7.94) 0.08 (7.83)
Lagged EONIA spread  0.13 (2.17) 0.11 (1.86) 0.04 (0.78) 0.05 (0.88)
Positive values -0.69 (-7.04) -0.72 (-7.51) -0.59 (-6.61) -0.59 (-6.58)
All observations -0.28 (-5.43) - - -
Excl. ￿no bail-outs￿ - 0.19 (1.45) 0.18 (1.56) 0.18 (1.55)
Liquidity
situation in the





Only ￿no bail-outs￿ - -0.34 (-6.59) - -
Liquidity in the previous weeks to the last of the MP -0.02 (-3.00) -0.02 (-3.15) -0.02 (-3.53) -0.02 (-3.53)
All together - - 0.64 (9.24) -
20 February 2001 - - - 0.68 (5.89)
18 April 2001 - - - 0.58 (4.77)
Dummy for ￿no
bail-out￿ episodes
16 October 2001 - - - 0.65 (5.62)
Dummy for terrorist attacks 11 September 2001 - - -0.22 (-1.82) -0.22 (-1.81)
Dummy for end of the year effect 2001 - - 0.59 (5.17) 0.59 (5.15)
Dummy for cash changeover 22 January 2002 - - -0.33 (-2.78) -0.33 (-2.76)
R squared 0.37 0.42 0.58 0.58
DW Serial correlation 1.81 1.8 1.86 1.84
Autocorrelation AR 1-2 test:  F(2,165) = 2.2362 [0.1101] F(2,164)= 2.0211 [0.1358] F(2,161)=0.71771 [0.4894] F(2,159)=0.99837 [0.3708]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) Chi^2(2) = 62.89 [0.00]** Chi^2(2)=58.551[0.00]** Chi^2(2)=165.46[0.00]** Chi^2(2)=166.13[0.00]**
ARCH 1-1 test:  F(1,165) = 5.254 [0.0232]* F(1,164)=5.9131 [0.0161]* F(1,161)=0.64052 [0.4247] F(1,159)=0.61881 [0.4327]
RESET test:  F(1,166) = 6.762 [0.0102]* F(1,165)=0.01659 [0.8977] F(1,162)=5.4035 [0.0213]* F(1,160)=6.0729 [0.0148]*Annex II ￿ Chart and Tables
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Table 4 ￿ OLS estimation of the supply equation using different interest rate measures; (t-statistics) and [critical values] in brackets
The dependent variable is the Policy variable (estimation sample from 3 August 1999 to 23 November 2002)
Lagged EONIA spread*
Main supply equation
Spread between 2-week EONIA
swap and the main refinancing rate,
lagged
Spread between 1m/1m forward
and the main refinancing rate on
announcement day, lagged
Constant -0.07 (-1.39) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.21)
Interest rate measures 2.12 (5.24) 1.12 (3.41) 0.72 (3.35)
The policy variable, lagged 0.07 (2.16) 0.03 (0.89) 0.03 (0.83)
Dummy for end month 1999 and 2000 1.14 (7.91) 0.97 (6.13) 0.98 (6.17)
Dummy for end of the year effect 1.01 (3.45) 0.87 (2.86) 0.91 (3.00)
Dummy for the loose policy period in the fall of 1999 1.09 (5.42) 1.13 (5.32) 1.09 (5.17)
Dummy for underbidding episodes -7.31 (-28.8) -7.38 (-27.9) -7.21 (-26.4)
Dummy for "no bail-out" episodes -1.66 (-4.22) -1.16 (-2.97) -1.02 (-2.64)
Dummy for MRO diverging sizes 6 March 2001 -4.05 (-8.09) -3.83 (-7.32) -3.76 (-7.16)
Dummy for MRO diverging sizes 24 April 2001 8.30 (16.6) 8.16 (15.6) 8.27 (15.8)
Dummy for fine-tuning operation 11 January 2000 1.52 (3.00) 1.93 (3.69) 1.83 (3.49)
Dummy for fine-tuning operation 27 June 2000 1.92 (3.72) 1.91 (3.52) 1.89 (3.50)
Dummy for fine-tuning operation 8 and 15 January 2002 1.12 (3.12) 1.30 (3.49) 1.37 (3.67)
R squared 0.90 0.89 0.89
DW Serial correlation 2.03 2.21 2.16
Autocorrelation AR 1-2 test:  F(2,157) = 3.0143 [0.0519] F(2,157) = 1.8549 [0.1599] F(2,157) = 2.2531 [0.1085]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 57.145 [0.0000]** Chi^2(2) = 55.685 [0.0000]** Chi^2(2) = 60.464 [0.0000]**
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,157) = 0.20604 [0.6505] F(1,157) = 0.35161 [0.5541] F(1,157) = 0.077356 [0.7813]
RESET test: F(1,158) = 1.5542 [0.2144] F(1,158) = 0.42038 [0.5177] F(1,158) = 5.5643 [0.0196]*